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If we are going to have a treaty about migratory birds, let us have 
some place where they can come and remain safely and be a pleasure 
and companions.1 
Nobody is trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters from 
killing game out of season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and 
ruining the country by it.2 
 
One of the first federal wildlife protection statutes, the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act of 19183 (MBTA), remains relatively unchanged over 
eighty-five years after its enactment.4  Threats to migratory birds, 
however, have changed dramatically.  Concerns about overexploit-
ation of birds prompted the MBTA’s passage,5 but habitat destruction 
is responsible for the current biodiversity crisis.6  Indeed, more than 
1200 species are facing extinction in the United States,7 and habitat 
destruction is a contributing factor for more than ninety-five percent 
of these imperiled species.8  Of the more than 800 species of native 
birds in the United States, 67 are federally listed as endangered or 
threatened, and “[a]n additional 184 are species of conservation 
concern because of their small distribution, high threats, or declining 
populations.” 9 
 
 1. 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (1918) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 2. 55 CONG. REC. 4816 (1917) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
 3. 16 U.S.C. § 703–712 (2006). 
 4. See infra notes 40–53. 
 5. See infra Section I.A. 
 6. GARY K. MEFFE & C. RONALD CARROLL, PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
148 (2d ed. 1997). 
 7. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SPECIES REPORTS: SUMMARY OF LISTED SPECIES 
LISTED POPULATIONS AND RECOVERY PLANS, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/
TESSBoxscore (last visited on Apr. 18, 2010). 
 8. KIM DELFINO, A JOINT REPORT FROM U.S. PIRG AND SIERRA CLUB, WILDLIFE 
NEEDS WILD PLACES: THE STATE OF DISAPPEARING SPECIES AND THEIR HABITAT 10 (1997). 
 9. NORTH AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVATION INITIATIVE, U.S. COMMITTEE, ET AL., THE 
STATE OF THE BIRDS: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (2009), available at 
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Current environmental laws provide some protection for wildlife 
habitat.  The National Forest Management Act10 requires the United 
States Forest Service to retain a diversity of plant communities in 
national forests.11  This statute provides no protection for wildlife on 
private lands, however, and protection of wildlife on public lands 
often takes a backseat to timber and other consumptive uses.12  The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) protects habitat for threatened and 
endangered species,13 but this protection often comes too late to 
enable species recovery.14  Consequently, environmentalists are trying 
to find new tools to protect wildlife habitat.  
In the past decade, the MBTA has received some attention from 
environmental law scholars and practitioners hoping to breathe new 
life into this relatively ignored statute.15  Indeed, the MBTA has the 
potential to be a powerful tool for addressing biodiversity loss.  Its 
expansive language provides protection for more than 800 species of 
migratory birds on public and private lands.16  Importantly, the MBTA 
protects species before they become threatened or endangered.  As 
such, it is well-suited to fill the gaps left by other environmental laws. 
This paper analyzes the MBTA’s capacity to protect wildlife habi-
tat.  Part I provides an overview of the MBTA, including the context of 
its passage, its major provisions, and its modest evolution since 1918.  
Part II summarizes case law interpreting the MBTA in the context of 
habitat destruction.  Part III critically examines the MBTA’s text, 
legislative history, purpose, and prior applications and argues that the 
statute should be interpreted to protect bird habitat.  Recognizing 
that the judiciary has been reluctant to give the MBTA this interpreta-
tion, the paper concludes by calling for legislative reform. 
 
http://www.stateofthebirds.org/pdf_files/State_of_the_Birds_2009.pdf. 
 10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2006). 
 11. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006). 
 12. See Elizabeth Losos, et al., Taxpayer-Subsidized Resource Extraction Harms Species, 
45 BIOSCIENCE 446 (1995). 
 13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536 (2006) (prohibiting federal agencies from adversely 
modifying critical habitat and prohibiting significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife). 
 14. Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 19 n.82 (1996). 
 15. See Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 823, n.2 (1998). 
 16. 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2009). 
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 I.  THE MBTA’S ENACTMENT, MAJOR PROVISIONS, AND MODEST 
EVOLUTION 
A. Congress Passed the MBTA in Response to a Decline in Migratory 
Birds 
Mass destruction of birds for food, sport, and millinery purposes 
occurred at the end of the nineteenth century.17  Several species went 
extinct, including the passenger pigeon.18  In response to the decline 
of birds, a bird protection movement formed that sought to achieve 
legal protections for migratory birds.19  The MBTA is the most 
important result of these efforts.20 
The MBTA gave effect to a treaty signed between the United 
States and Great Britain on behalf of Canada for the protection of 
migratory birds (hereinafter “Canadian Convention”).21  In a letter to 
President Woodrow Wilson urging his approval of the treaty, Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing summarized the concerns that motivated the 
treaty negotiations: 
Not very many years ago vast numbers of waterfowl and sho-
rebirds nested within the limits of the United States . . . but 
the extension of agriculture, and particularly the draining 
on a large scale of swamps and meadows, together with im-
proved firearms and a vast increase in the number of 
sportsmen, have so altered conditions that comparatively few 
migratory game birds nest within our limits.22  
This loss of game birds concerned hunters dependent on the 
 
 17. See Finet, supra note 14, at 6 n.15. 
 18. See George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and 
Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 168 (1979) (citing P. 
MATTHEISSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1959)). 
 19. See Finet, supra note 14, at 6 n.15. 
 20. Congress’s first attempt to protect migratory birds was the 1913 McLean-
Weeks Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847 (repealed 1918).  It was 
declared invalid in multiple federal court rulings as beyond Congress’s power.  
United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh, 221 
F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).  A date for oral argument was set before the United States 
Supreme Court, but the case was not heard because Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
avoided the issue by negotiating a treaty with Canada and invoking the treaty power as 
the constitutional authority for the MBTA.  See Coggins & Patti, supra note 18, at 169.  
The United States Supreme Court later upheld the MBTA as a valid use of the treaty 
power.  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).     
 21. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (on behalf of 
Canada), Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628. 
 22. United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1080–
81 (D. Colo. 1999) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2 (1918)). 
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birds for their sport, but the Canadian Convention also offered 
protection for non-game birds.23  Concern for non-game birds came 
from farmers who wanted protection for birds that feed on insects 
injurious to crops.24  In addition, the government recognized aesthetic 
interests in birds, and that many Americans “have happy memories of 
their homes made brighter and more attractive by the annual 
visitation of the robin . . . .”25 
B. The MBTA’s Simple Mandate Has Remained Almost Unchanged 
Since Enactment 
The MBTA is a very simple statute, especially in comparison to 
other environmental statutes.  Its main operative provisions are found 
in sections 70326 and 704(a).27  Using very expansive language,28 
section 703 prohibits taking “at any time, by any means or in any 
manner . . . any migratory bird, [or] any part, nest, or eggs of any such 
bird” unless authorized by the Secretary of the Interior.29  Section 
704(a) authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations that allow the 
taking of migratory birds that are “compatible with the terms” and 
“carry out the purposes” of the migratory bird conventions.30  These 
two primary sections are supplemented and implemented by eight 
other sections.  The remaining sections cover bird baiting,31 transpor-
tation and importation of birds,32 arrests and search warrants,33 
 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2 (1918) (stating that five million sportsmen in the 
country urge “prompt action to protect migratory birds”). 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2 (speaking of a “patriotic duty” to prevent “the 
indiscriminate slaughter of birds which destroy insects which feed upon our crops 
and damage hem [sic] to the extent of many millions of dollars”). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2–3 (“[M]illions of people in the United States are 
deeply interested in the conservation and increase of our bird life from an esthetic 
viewpoint . . . .”). 
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). 
 27. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
 28. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56, 57, 59–60 (1979) (describing the 
statutory prohibitions of the MBTA as “comprehensive,” “exhaustive,” “carefully 
enumerated,” “expansive,” and “sweepingly framed”). 
 29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–704 (2006). 
 30. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
 31. 16 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006) (providing that it is unlawful to bait a migratory 
bird and knowingly take a migratory bird over a baited field). 
 32. 16 U.S.C. § 705 (2006) (providing that it is unlawful to transport or import 
illegally taken migratory birds across state or country lines). 
 33. 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (authorizing employees of the Department of the 
Interior to enforce the Act by arresting without a warrant any person violating the Act 
in his or her presence). 
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penalties,34 allowance of more protective state laws,35 appropriations,36 
the statute’s short title and savings clause,37 game farms,38 and 
authorization for implementing regulations.39   
The MBTA has remained almost unchanged since enactment in 
1918.  Congress passed technical amendments to the MBTA to 
incorporate three additional migratory bird conventions, including 
Mexico in 1936,40 Japan in 1974,41 and the U.S.S.R. in 1989.42  
Congress amended the MBTA in 196043 and 199844 to increase fines 
for violations, and in 1978 to require forfeiture of illegally taken birds, 
 
 34. 16 U.S.C. § 707 (2006) (providing a $15,000 fine and/or six months 
imprisonment for misdemeanor violations of the Act and providing a $2,000 fine 
and/or two years imprisonment and forfeiture of all equipment used by persons 
guilty of felony violations, which are defined as knowingly taking with the intent to 
sell migratory birds). 
 35. 16 U.S.C. § 708 (2006) (providing that the states may make and enforce laws 
more protective of migratory birds). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 709a (2006) (authorizing appropriations to carry out the 
conventions and the statute). 
 37. 16 U.S.C. § 710 (2006) (providing that if any clause of the MBTA is found 
invalid the remaining parts should be unaffected). 
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 711 (2006) (providing that the Act does not prevent breeding of 
migratory game birds on game farms). 
 39. 16 U.S.C. § 712 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary to issue regulations to 
allow the taking of migratory birds for subsistence by indigenous inhabitants of Alaska 
and generally authorizing the Secretary to issues regulations necessary for implemen-
tation of the migratory bird conventions).  
 40. Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 634, 49 Stat. 1555 (1936)(current version at 16 
U.S.C. § 703 (2006)); Convention Between the United States of America and the 
United Mexican States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, 
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter “Mexican Convention”].  
 41. Act of June 1, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190 (1974) (current 16 
U.S.C. § 703 (2006)); Convention Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and 
Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 
U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter “Japanese Convention”]. 
 42. North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-233, 103 Stat. 
1968, § 15 (1989) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006)); Convention Between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning 
the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 
1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647 [hereinafter “Soviet Convention”]. 
 43. Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866 (1960) (current version 
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 704, 707 (2006)) (retaining the $500 fine and/or six months in jail for 
misdemeanor convictions, while adding a felony conviction for taking migratory birds 
with the intent to sell, subject to a $2000 fine and/or two years in jail and forfeiture of 
all equipment used in the violation). 
 44. Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 103, 112 Stat. 2956 
(1998) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 704, 707 (2006)) (increasing the fine for 
misdemeanor convictions from $500 to $15,000). 
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bird parts, nests, and eggs.45  Language added in 1974 clarified that 
the MBTA’s prohibition on the sale of migratory birds includes “any 
product . . . composed in whole or part, of any such bird.”46  Congress 
has three times directed the Secretary to promulgate regulations to 
allow the taking of migratory birds, including take by Alaskan 
subsistence hunters in 1978,47 take of overabundant populations of 
mid-continent light geese in 1999,48 and take by the military in 2002.49  
While the MBTA is generally a strict liability statute, Congress added 
scienter requirements in 1986 for felony prosecutions for selling 
migratory birds,50 and in 1998 for misdemeanor prosecutions for 
hunting over baited fields.51  Most recently, in 2004, Congress 
amended the MBTA to limit its application to migratory bird species 
native to the United States or its territories.52  While there were several 
other minor or technical amendments,53 it is clear that the MBTA has 
gone through a very modest evolution over the ninety years since its 
passage.  
 
 45. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No.  95-616, § 3(h)(1), 92 Stat. 3111–12 (1978) 
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2006)). 
 46. Act of June 1, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-300, § 1, 88 Stat. 190 (1974). 
 47. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-616, § 3(h)(2), 92 Stat. 3112 (1978). 
 48. Arctic Tundra Habitat Emergency Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-108, §§ 
1–5, 113 Stat. 1491 (1999). 
 49. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 107-314, § 315, 116 Stat. 2509 (2002). 
 50. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100 Stat. 3590 
(1986) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006)) (requiring knowledge that 
actions constitute sale, barter, or offer to sell an item and that such item was a bird or 
portion thereof).  
 51. Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 102, 112 Stat. 2956 
(1998) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 704(b)) (amending the Act to make unlawful 
hunting over baited fields where “the person knows or reasonably should know that” 
he or she is hunting over baited fields and making baiting a separate offense from 
hunting over a baited field). 
 52. Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 143(b), 
118 Stat. 3071 (2004); see Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 876 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (refusing to enjoin the State of Maryland from killing mute swans to 
protect aquatic habitat because mute swans are not native migratory birds). 
 53. Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 634, 49 Stat. 1555–57 (1936) (making appropria-
tions language more currently applicable and adding language to protect game 
mammals consistent with the Mexican convention); 1939 Reorg. Plan No. II, § 4(f), 
53 Stat. 1433, 1433–34 (1939) (transferring function of the Secretary of Agriculture 
dealing with “wild life, game, and migratory birds” to the Secretary of the Interior); 
Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 402(b)(2), 82 Stat. 1118 (1968) (re-
designating the U.S. commissioner with the U.S. magistrate); Act of Dec. 5, 1969, 
Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 10, 83 Stat. 282 (1969) (repealing and moving a section offering 
protection for game mammals).  
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II. COURTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER THE MBTA APPLIES TO 
HABITAT DESTRUCTION 
The MBTA clearly prohibits the taking of migratory birds, but it 
does not precisely define what activities should constitute a taking.54  
So, it is unclear whether the MBTA should apply to activities that 
destroy migratory bird habitat.  Unlike the ESA,55 the United States 
Supreme Court has not interpreted the takings provision in the 
MBTA, but the issue has been litigated before several appellate and 
district courts.   
A. Several Courts Hold That the MBTA Applies to Physical Conduct of 
the Sort Engaged in by Hunters and Poachers and Does Not Apply to 
Indirect Deaths of Migratory Birds Caused By Habitat Destruction  
Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans56 closely explores applicability of 
the MBTA to habitat destruction.  In Seattle Audubon, two bird 
conservation organizations argued that logging of old-growth timber 
in Washington and Oregon constitutes a violation of the MBTA 
because it destroys spotted owl habitat.57  The Ninth Circuit compared 
the MBTA and the ESA and concluded that the differences are 
“distinct and purposeful.”58  The MBTA’s implementing regulations 
define “take” as “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect,” or to attempt any such act.59  The definition of “take” in the 
ESA, in contrast, is defined in a broader way to include “harass” and 
“harm.”60  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the MBTA’s definition 
describes “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and 
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of 
 
 54. The MBTA provides that it shall be unlawful “to pursue, hunt, take, capture, 
kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill” migratory birds.  16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).  The 
MBTA’s implementing regulations define take as “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or attempt” any such act.  50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2009).   
 55. The definition of take in the ESA includes “harm,” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) 
(2006), and the United States Supreme Court upheld regulations defining harm as 
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering.”  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691, 708 (1995) (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)). 
 56. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 57. Id. at 298. 
 58. Id. at 303 (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. 
Wash. 1991)). 
 59. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2009). 
 60. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006). 
8
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the statute’s enactment in 1918.”61  The Ninth Circuit also relied on 
the fact that Congress failed to modify the MBTA to include “harm” 
or “harass,” even though it amended the MBTA the year following the 
enactment of the ESA.62 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that indirect killing during log-
ging operations is different from direct, but unintentional, killing that 
occurs when birds are poisoned.63  With this emphasis, the Ninth 
Circuit distinguished Seattle Audubon from two cases that held that 
poisoning of migratory birds falls within the MBTA’s prohibition on 
taking.64  In United States v. Corbin Farm Service,65 the district court ruled 
that defendants could be charged under the MBTA for bird deaths 
that occurred after applying a toxic pesticide to an alfalfa field 
inhabited by migratory birds.66  In United States v. FMC Corp.,67 the 
Second Circuit affirmed a criminal conviction for a pesticide corpora-
tion’s release of toxic chemicals into a wastewater pond that killed 
migratory birds.68 
Most courts construing the MBTA in the context of habitat de-
struction have followed Seattle Audubon.  In Newton County Wildlife Ass’n 
v. United States Forest Service,69 for example, the Eighth Circuit reasoned 
that the MBTA applies only to “physical conduct of the sort engaged 
in by hunters and poachers” and refused to enjoin four timber sales 
in the Ozarks National Forest.70  There have also been several district 
courts that have considered and rejected arguments that the MBTA 
applies to indirect bird deaths caused by habitat destruction.71  
 
 61. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302. 
 62. Id. at 303. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978). 
 66. Id. at 514, 536.  As an example of another corporate criminal conviction 
under the MBTA, the Exxon Corporation recently pled guilty to violating the MBTA 
in the deaths of eighty-five protected birds across five central and western states over 
the past five years.  The birds were killed after they came into contact with hydrocar-
bons at oil tanks, evaporation ponds, natural gas reserve pits, and disposal facilities.  
United States v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-mj-01097 (D. Colo. 2009); Amy Littlefield, 
Exxon Pleads Guilty in Birds’ Deaths, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A15. 
 67. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 68. Id. at 907–08. 
 69. 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998). 
 70. Id. at 113–16. “[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms 
‘take’ and ‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by 
hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the 
statute’s enactment in 1918.’”  Id. at 115.  In addition, the Eighth Circuit tentatively 
held that the MBTA does not even apply to federal agencies.  Id. 
 71. Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 548–49 (W.D. Pa.1997) (holding 
9
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B. A Few Courts Hold That the MBTA Applies to Direct Deaths of 
Migratory Birds from Habitat Destruction That Occurs During the Nesting 
Season 
No federal court has held that the MBTA applies to habitat de-
struction that indirectly causes deaths of migratory birds by making 
habitat unsuitable.72  As such, environmental plaintiffs have focused 
on logging during the nesting season because it directly destroys nests 
and eggs and juvenile birds that cannot fly away.73  Sierra Club v. 
Martin74 provides the most complete discussion on the applicability of 
the MBTA to habitat destruction that directly kills birds.  In Martin, 
the Sierra Club challenged timber sales during the nesting season in 
Chattahoochee and Oconee National Forests.75  The district court 
agreed with the Seattle Audubon line of cases that the MBTA does not 
apply to habitat destruction that only indirectly kills migratory birds.76  
 
that the MBTA does not apply to federal agencies but assuming, arguendo, that it did 
apply, citing Seattle Audubon and holding that habitat destruction does not fall within 
the MBTA because it applies only to hunters and poachers); Sierra Club v. Martin, 
933 F. Supp. 1559, 1564–65 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (following the Seattle Audubon line in so 
far as holding that the MBTA does not apply to indirect deaths but granting plaintiffs 
a preliminary injunction based on claim that timber sales during the nesting season 
would directly kill migratory birds in violation of the MBTA); Citizens Interested in 
Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 1502, 1509–10 (D. Or. 1991) (citing district 
court cases leading up to Seattle Audubon and finding that the proposed timber sale 
does not constitute a taking of migratory birds because the MBTA applies only to 
hunters and poachers); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, No. 87-1160-FR, 1991 WL 
81838, at *6–7 (D. Or. May 8, 1991) (holding that differences between the ESA and 
MBTA are “distinct and purposeful” and MBTA does not apply to habitat destruc-
tion); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, Nos. 89-160WD, C89-99(T)WD, 1991 WL 
180099, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 1991) (finding that the absence of “harm” and 
“harass” in the MBTA makes it distinct from the ESA); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n., 
126 IBLA 48, 66 (1993) (citing a district court case leading up to Seattle Audubon and 
holding that approval of a mining plan of operations does not involve a “taking” of 
migratory birds under the MBTA); In re Bar First Go Round Salvage Sale, 121 IBLA 
347, 351–52 (1991) (citing district court cases leading up to Seattle Audubon and 
rejecting the argument that BLM’s timber sales violate the MBTA and holding that 
even if MBTA did include habitat modification there is no evidence that the timber 
sale will kill birds). 
 72. But see Or. Natural Res. Council, 116 IBLA 355, 370 (1990) (“Therefore, 
action which degrades the environment in such a way as to result in the death of a 
migratory bird is prohibited by section 2 of the MBTA.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 96-2244, 1997 WL 295308, at 
*19 (7th Cir. May 28, 1997); Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (N.D. Ga. 
1996), rev’d, 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 
1559, 1573 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
 74. 933 F. Supp. 1559. 
 75. Id. at 1562–64. 
 76. Id. at 1564–65. 
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However, the court departed from Seattle Audubon when it held that 
the MBTA extends beyond hunters and poachers and does apply to 
timber sales during the nesting season.77 
The court’s decision relies heavily on United States v. Corbin Farm 
Service, one of the bird poisoning cases, which also held that the 
MBTA extends beyond hunting and poaching.78  As in Corbin Farm 
Service, the court was persuaded by the broad language in the MBTA, 
which prohibits killing migratory birds “by any means.”79  The court 
also reasoned that hunting is not the sole concern of the MBTA 
because many birds protected by the MBTA are not commonly 
hunted.80 
Sierra Club v. Martin was not the first case to distinguish between 
direct and indirect deaths from logging.  Martin followed Sierra Club v. 
United States Department of Agriculture.81  In Sierra Club v. United States 
Department of Agriculture, the Seventh Circuit held that the MBTA does 
not apply to birds killed indirectly by habitat destruction, but the 
court ordered the agency to consider on remand whether logging 
during the nesting season would directly kill young migratory birds in 
violation of the MBTA.82  Unlike this Seventh Circuit case, the 
environmental plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Martin had affirmative 
evidence of the number of bird deaths that would occur.83  Given the 
likelihood of success on its MBTA claim, the district court granted the 
Sierra Club a preliminary injunction to stop the timber sales.84  The 
decision was later reversed by the Eleventh Circuit, which held that 
the MBTA does not apply to federal agencies,85 but this holding 
contradicts a later decision from the D.C. Circuit and dicta from the 
United States Supreme Court.86 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 1565; United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. 
Cal. 1978); see also supra text accompanying note 66. 
 79. Martin, 933 F. Supp. at 1565 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. 116 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 82. Id. at *19–20. 
 83. Martin, 933 F. Supp. at 1563, 1565 (finding that 2,000 to 9,000 juvenile 
migratory birds will be killed directly by timber sale projects). 
 84. Id. at 1572–73. 
 85. Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 86. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 437–38 (1992) (indicating 
in two sections of its opinion that federal agencies possess obligations under the 
MBTA); Humane Soc’y v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 886–88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the MBTA does apply to federal agencies because the Administrative Procedures 
Act may be used by a party with standing to challenge government action that would 
violate the MBTA); see Michael Deminico & Heather Eisenlord, A Proper Refusal of 
11
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C. One Court Holds That the MBTA Does Not Apply to Even Direct 
Deaths of Migratory Birds From Habitat Destruction If the Deaths are 
Unintentional 
In Mahler v. United States Forest Service,87 another district court ad-
dressed whether the MBTA applies to direct deaths of migratory birds 
caused by habitat destruction.88  In Mahler, a nearby resident and 
frequent visitor to the Hoosier National Forest sought to enjoin a 
timber salvage operation on fifty acres of forest during the nesting 
season.89  Even though the court agreed with the plaintiff that logging 
operations during nesting would directly kill birds, the court refused 
to enjoin the United States Forest Service.90  The court held that the 
MBTA only applies to activities that are “intended to harm birds or to 
exploit birds, such as hunting and trapping, and trafficking in birds 
and bird parts.”91   
The court acknowledged that there have been convictions under 
the MBTA for unintentional deaths of migratory birds due to 
poisoning.92  The court found the strict liability approach unreasona-
ble, however, because it “would impose criminal liability on a person 
for the death of a bird under circumstances where no criminal 
liability would be imposed for even the death of another person.”93  
The court was particularly concerned that there would be no stopping 
point for criminal liability and suggested that strict liability would 
even require conviction of farmers who run over nests while mowing 
hay.94 
 
Deference: An Analysis of Humane Society v. Glickman in Light of the Supreme Court’s Most 
Recent Standard for Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
378, 390–98 (2002); Helen M. Kim, Chopping Down the Birds: Logging and the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act, 31 ENVTL. L. 125, 141–48 (2001). 
 87.  927 F. Supp. 1559 (E.D. Ind. 1996). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1575. 
 90. Id. at 1583.  Indeed, there is a substantial body of case law holding that the 
MBTA has no scienter requirement.  See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6160 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2009) (summarizing cases and affirming 
misdemeanor convictions under the MBTA for deaths of migratory birds uninten-
tionally killed by devices used in the oil and gas industry to process crude oil). 
 91. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 1577–79. 
 93. Id. at 1578. 
 94. Id.  Similar concerns motivated a district court to reverse a conviction under 
12
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Unlike most cases dealing with habitat destruction under the 
MBTA, the Mahler court provided a lengthy analysis of the language, 
legislative history, and application of the MBTA.95  The court rea-
soned that the MBTA’s broad language only extended “by any means 
or in any manner” to the hunting of migratory birds.96  The court 
sifted through the MBTA’s legislative history and found no indication 
that Congress had intended the MBTA to extend to habitat destruc-
tion.97  Finally, the court was unwilling to accept strict liability because 
of fear that it would substantially restrict logging on both public and 
private lands.98 
III. DESTRUCTION OF HABITAT THAT DIRECTLY KILLS MIGRATORY 
BIRDS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF THE MBTA 
Environmental plaintiffs wishing to use the MBTA to protect mi-
gratory bird habitat have been largely unsuccessful, with courts 
seeking defensible approaches to limit MBTA liability.99  The Seattle 
Audubon line of cases emphasizes distinctions between the ESA and 
MBTA to justify the conclusion that the MBTA applies only to direct 
physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers.100  
Mahler requires intent to kill migratory birds.101  A critical analysis of 
the MBTA’s text, legislative history, purpose, and prior applications 
shows that both approaches are flawed.  The MBTA should not be 
limited to hunting and poaching nor only intentional acts, but there 
must be a reasonable stopping point for MBTA liability.  Analysis of 
the closeness of the causal link may offer the best approach to limiting 
liability. 
A. Application of the MBTA Should Extend Beyond Hunting and 
 
the MBTA of a defendant that applied pesticides to seed alfalfa growing on his farm 
that resulted in the death of a flock of geese that ingested the pesticides.  United 
States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989).  The district court commented 
that because the MBTA is a strict liability statute “a homeowner could be pursued 
under the MBTA if a flock of geese crashed into his plate-glass window and were 
killed.”  Id. at 744.  Finding the statute vague, the district court held that it would be 
unconstitutional to impose criminal liability because the pesticide was applied with 
due care and its use in the past had occurred without serious incident.  Id. at 743–44.    
 95. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579–83. 
 96. Id. at 1579. 
 97. Id. at 1580–81. 
 98. Id. at 1581–82. 
 99. See supra Part II. 
 100. See supra Part II A. 
 101. See supra Part II C. 
13
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Poaching   
The MBTA uses extremely broad language.102  Section 703 of the 
MBTA provides that it shall be unlawful “by any means or in any 
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, [or] kill” migratory birds.103  
The phrase “by any means or in any manner” emphasizes the MBTA’s 
expansive scope.  In addition, if Congress intended the MBTA to only 
apply to hunting and poaching, there was no need to include the 
broader words “take” and “kill.”  Admittedly, it is unclear how 
broadly “take” and “kill” should be interpreted, and there is a strong 
argument that the MBTA should be interpreted more narrowly than 
the ESA.104  Just because there are “distinct and purposeful” differ-
ences between the MBTA and ESA,105 however, does not mean that 
the MBTA must be limited to hunting and poaching. 
Legislative history does not offer a decisive answer to how broadly 
the MBTA should be interpreted.  Some statements by members of 
Congress indicate that controlling overexploitation of game birds was 
the MBTA’s primary focus,106 but others discuss the expansiveness of 
the MBTA’s prohibitions.107  Even if negotiation of the original treaty 
was primarily motivated by concerns about overexploitation of game 
birds, it is nevertheless clear from the legislative history that concerns 
about loss of migratory bird habitat and non-game birds were 
additional motivating factors.108  Indeed, the MBTA protects more 
than 800 species,109 but only a small fraction of these species are 
commonly sought by hunters or poachers.110  If the MBTA merely 
 
 102. See supra note 28. 
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). 
 104. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra note 58. 
 106. See, e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 4816 (1917) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“Nobody is 
trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters from killing game out of 
season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and ruining the country by it.”), cited in 
United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1080 (D. Colo. 1999) 
(providing a summary of comments from the Congressional Record indicating that 
Congress intended the MBTA to regulate recreational and commercial hunting).  
 107. See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (1918) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“If we are 
going to have a treaty about migratory birds, let us have some place where they can 
come and remain safely and be a pleasure and companions.”), cited in Moon Lake Elec. 
Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81 (providing a summary of comments from the 
Congressional Record indicating that Congress intended the MBTA to regulate more 
than just hunting and poaching). 
 108. See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
 109. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2009) (listing the species of migratory birds protected 
by the MBTA). 
 110. See id.; see also Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1996) 
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prohibits hunting and poaching, there was no reason to offer 
protection to nongame species.   
Supporters of a narrow construction of “take” argue that Con-
gress’s failure to amend the MBTA to include “harm” and “harass” 
shows that Congress did not intend the MBTA to apply to habitat.111  
This reasoning is unpersuasive, however, because Congress was also 
aware that the MBTA has been applied in contexts outside of hunting 
and poaching—but Congress did not amend the MBTA to limit its 
application.112  Specifically, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
has prosecuted bird deaths from oil pits,113 exposure to pesticides,114 
and electrocution by electrical wires.115  In addition, environmental 
groups have brought claims involving bird deaths from habitat 
destruction,116 pollution from mine tailings,117 and military bombing 
 
(noting that song birds and other birds not commonly hunted are protected by the 
MBTA). 
 111. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(finding the MBTA’s definition of “take” did not include habitat modification or 
degradation due to the fact that Congress failed to modify the MBTA to include harm 
or harass, even though it amended the MBTA the year following the enactment of the 
ESA). 
 112. For example, Congress held hearings in 1985 to discuss whether the 
operation of a contaminated reservoir by a federal agency violated the MBTA.  
Agricultural Drainage Problems and Contamination at Kesterson Reservoir: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
99th Cong. 10–19, 22–25, 30–39, 42–43, 45–51, 62–65, 104–10, 128–30, 150–51, 215, 
523–24, 525–32 (1985).  Although the hearings alerted Congress that under current 
case law the reservoir may violate the MBTA, Congress never amended the MBTA to 
limit its application to hunters and poachers. 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Union Tex. Petroleum, No. 73-CR-127, 1973 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15616 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973); see also Coggins & Patti, supra note 18, at 
184–85 (summarizing Union Tex. Petroleum, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616, United 
States v. Equity Corp., Cr. No. 75-51 (D. Utah Dec. 8, 1975), and United States v. 
Stuarco Oil, No. 73-CR-129, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973)—a 
case consolidated with United States v. Texas Petroleum). 
 114. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
 115. See infra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra Part II.  Congress seemed to acquiesce to the notion that the MBTA 
applies to migratory bird habitat when it passed Northwest Timber Compromise, 
which provided a limited exemption from the MBTA for old-growth timber sales in 
Washington and Oregon from the MBTA.  Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989) (providing in 
section 318 that certain timber sales affecting spotted owls would be in compliance 
with all other environmental laws if the sales meet the requirements in the Northwest 
Timber Compromise); see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 437–38 
(1992) (explaining how the Northwest Timber Compromise exempted certain sales 
from the MBTA). 
 117. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 126 IBLA 48 (1993).  
15
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exercises.118  Congress’s failure to amend the MBTA in response to 
these cases indicates Congress’s acquiescence to a broader applica-
tion. 
Rather than amend the MBTA to narrow its scope, Congress has 
largely left the MBTA alone.119  Most amendments to the MBTA have 
broadened its scope or strengthened its protections.120  For example, 
Congress amended the MBTA to incorporate additional migratory 
bird conventions that expand protections for migratory birds.121  
Importantly, the Japanese and Soviet Conventions include language 
about protection of migratory bird habitat.122   
B. Application of the MBTA Should Extend to Unintentional Acts 
The MBTA makes a distinction between misdemeanor and felony 
offenses.  Section 707(a) provides that “any person . . . who shall 
violate any provisions of said conventions or of this [Act] . . . shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”123  Section 707(b) provides that 
“[w]hoever, in violation of this [Act], shall knowingly . . . take by any 
manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell . . . such 
bird, or . . . sell . . . any migratory bird shall be guilty of a felony.”124  
 
 118. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2002).  
When environmental groups succeeded on their claim that bird deaths during 
military training exercises violated the MBTA, Congress did not amend the act to 
restrict its application to hunters.  Rather, it provided a temporary exemption for the 
military until the United States Fish and Wildlife Service promulgates regulations to 
allow take during military training exercises.  See supra note 49.  
 119. See supra notes 40–53 and accompanying text. 
 120. The only exceptions thus far were when Congress added scienter require-
ments for certain offenses, and directed the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to 
promulgate regulations to allow bird take.  See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying 
text. 
 121. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 122. The Japanese Convention endeavors to establish sanctuaries and “take 
appropriate measures to preserve and enhance the environment.”  The Convention 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Distinction, and 
Their Environment, U.S.-Japan, Sep. 19, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 3329, 3335.  The Russian 
Convention commits the parties to establish preserves, protected areas, and facilities 
for the conservation of migratory birds and take measures necessary “to protect and 
enhance the environment of migratory birds and to prevent and abate the pollution 
or detrimental alteration of that environment.”  The Convention Between the United 
States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the 
Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.–U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 
1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647, 4653. 
 123. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006). 
 124. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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In 1960, Congress added section 707(b) in response to concerns that 
market hunters that kill hundreds of birds were subject to the same 
liability as a sport hunter that took one bird out of season.125  In 1986, 
Congress added “knowingly” to section 707(b) because of concerns 
about the constitutionality of strict liability felony offenses.126 
If Congress wanted to alter the strict liability scheme for misde-
meanors, Congress would have added the term “knowingly” to 
section 707(a) and section 707(b).  Rather, the legislative history 
makes clear that Congress intended to retain strict liability for 
misdemeanor offenses: “Nothing in this amendment is intended to 
alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misdemeanor prosecutions 
under 16 U.S.C. [§] 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in 
many Federal court decisions.”127  
Mahler construed the MBTA to require intentionality because of 
concern that any other interpretation would lead to unreasonable 
results.128  Nevertheless, most courts that have examined this issue 
have upheld the strict liability scheme for misdemeanor offenses.129  
Even though adding the intentionality requirement might be a 
convenient way to limit MBTA liability, this interpretation is simply 
not what Congress intended. 
C. Analysis of the Causal Link May be the Best Approach to Limit MBTA 
Liability 
The MBTA’s language is expansive and provides no clear limits to 
liability.  As a consequence, inconsistent judicial interpretations have 
created substantial uncertainty.130  A defensible limit on liability is 
 
 125. S. REP. NO. 86-1779, at 1 (1960). 
 126. S. REP. NO. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. 
 127. Id.  But see Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1581 (S.D. Ind. 
1996) (arguing that Congress retained strict liability only in so far as it affects hunters 
and poachers, so there is no liability for habitat destruction that leads to the 
unintentional death of birds). 
 128. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 129. See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 
360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wood, 
437 F.2d 91, 91 (9th Cir. 1971); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).  But see United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 
F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring a showing of negligence). 
 130. See supra Part II.  
17
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needed,131 and analysis of the causal link leading to bird death may 
offer the best approach.132   
1. Only a Few Courts Have Used a Causal Analysis to Limit MBTA 
Liability 
The only MBTA case explicitly examining the closeness of the 
causal link is United States v. Moon Lake Electrical Ass’n.133  In Moon Lake 
Electrical Ass’n, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service brought 
charges against a rural electrical cooperative for the deaths of 
seventeen migratory birds of prey, caused by the company’s failure to 
install inexpensive equipment on power poles.134  The court refused to 
dismiss the charges and used a proximate cause analysis to assess 
MBTA liability.135  The court explained:  
[T]o  obtain a guilty verdict under § 707(a), the government 
must prove proximate causation, also known as “legal causa-
tion,” beyond a reasonable doubt.  In this context, “prox-
imate cause” is generally defined as “that which, in a natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient inter-
vening cause, produces the injury and without which the 
accident could not have happened, if the injury be one 
which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a nat-
ural consequence of the wrongful act.”136 
The causal link approach hinges on the directness of the link and 
the foreseeability of bird deaths.  A similar approach was used in Sierra 
Club v. Martin and Sierra Club v. USDA.137  These cases made a critical 
distinction between timber harvest that directly killed migratory birds 
by cutting down trees containing active nests, and timber harvest that 
only indirectly killed birds by making habitat unsuitable for migratory 
birds.138  Although these cases did not explicitly examine the closeness 
of the causal link, the analysis of whether the action directly or 
indirectly killed birds inherently involves a causation analysis. 
 
 131. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Certainly 
construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as deaths caused 
by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or picture windows in 
residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend reason and common sense.”). 
 132. One legal scholar has argued that proximate cause is the only comprehensive 
analytical structure for analyzing MBTA guilt.  See Kim, supra note 86, at 140–41.   
 133. United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999). 
 134. Id. at 1071. 
 135. Id. at 1085, 1088. 
 136. Id. at 1085 (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 137. See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text. 
 138. See id. 
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2. Analysis of the Closeness of the Causal Link Has Many 
Advantages 
The Moon Lake court did not offer any analysis in defense of the 
causal approach, but it has several advantages.  To begin, a causal 
approach is justifiable based upon the plain language of the MBTA.  
As Seattle Audubon emphasizes, the MBTA’s statutory language is 
meaningfully different from the ESA.139  The inclusion of “harm” and 
“harass” in the definition of “take” in the ESA allows “take” to 
encompass indirect actions in the ESA that are not appropriate for 
the MBTA.140  The use of a causal approach for the MBTA reflects this 
difference by requiring a direct link between the action and bird 
death.141  Unlike Seattle Audubon, the causal approach recognizes that 
the MBTA is different from the ESA without arbitrarily limiting it to 
hunters and poachers. 
A second advantage of the causal method is that it comports with 
prior applications of the MBTA.  It is unreasonable to interpret the 
MBTA broadly when birds are killed from exposure to oil pits142 and 
pesticides143 but purport to limit the MBTA to hunting and poaching 
when birds are killed from habitat destruction.144  The causal method 
offers a reasoned explanation for attaching MBTA liability for direct 
deaths of birds from oil pits, poisons, and habitat destruction during 
the nesting season, while not extending liability for habitat destruc-
tion that only indirectly kills birds by making habitat unsuitable. 
Another advantage is that the causal approach allows the MBTA 
to respond to modern threats to migratory birds.  Overexploitation 
was once the biggest threat to biodiversity, but habitat destruction and 
pollution are much bigger threats today.145  Congress intended the 
MBTA to protect migratory birds,146 and even though loss of birds 
from hunters and poachers may have been a primary focus at the time 
of enactment,147 Congress’s expansive language needs to be inter-
preted broadly for the MBTA to continue to have relevance today.  
 
 139. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 55. 
 141. A direct link can be defined as “a natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.”  Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 
1085. 
 142. See supra note 113. 
 143. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra Part II A. 
 145. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra Part I A. 
 147. See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
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A final advantage of the causal approach is that it offers some 
protection for migratory bird habitat without incapacitating the 
timber industry.  By prohibiting habitat destruction that directly kills 
migratory birds, the causal approach would likely prohibit the timber 
industry from harvesting during the nesting season.148  In many parts 
of the country, timber is already primarily harvested in the winter to 
prevent damage to soils and vegetation that can occur when the 
ground is soft.  Although prohibiting timber harvest during the 
nesting season might create some hardship for the timber industry, 
this application of the MBTA has the advantage of ending the present 
inconsistency of allowing loggers to kill an unlimited number of 
migratory birds while at the same time prosecuting individuals for 
selling a feather.149   
3. Causal Link Analysis Does Not Provide Needed Certainty 
The causal link approach to limiting MBTA liability has many 
advantages, but it widens potential liability without providing a bright-
line test.150  This uncertainty is problematic.  Uncertainty raises due 
process concerns because the MBTA is a criminal statute.151  It also 
generates litigation as environmental groups test legal theories and try 
to find new ways to use the MBTA to shape land management.152  
Significantly, uncertainty leaves courts in the position of making 
policy decisions—decisions that should be made by Congress.153  
Even though the causal link approach would subject many activi-
ties to potential MBTA liability, there are constraining factors.  First, 
 
 148. Because harvesting during the nesting season directly destroys eggs and 
nests, and kills juvenile birds, the causal link is much closer than timber harvest that 
merely makes habitat unsuitable for migratory birds.  See supra notes 73–86 and 
accompanying text. 
 149. Kim, supra note 86, at 150.  Logging does kill many birds.  One study found 
that up to 666 nests would be destroyed as a result of four timber sales in Arkansas, 
and another found that up to 9000 young migratory birds would be killed by seven 
timber sales in Georgia.  See Alliance for the Wild Rockies et al., Submission to the 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 9, available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf.   
 150. For example, an argument can be made that the MBTA should apply to bird 
deaths from collision with communication towers because the deaths are direct, 
foreseeable, and avoidable.  See Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict 
Criminal Liability for Non-hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 315, 
351–53 (1999). 
 151. Id. at 337–38. 
 152. Kim, supra note 86, at 149. 
 153. See Corcoran, supra note 150, at 341–42. 
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prosecutorial discretion will prevent most unreasonable applications 
of the MBTA.  Indeed, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service has 
never enforced the MBTA against loggers.154  In addition, judicial 
discretion in sentencing will ensure that unreasonable applications 
are met with minor penalties.155  Finally, the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service could use its authority under section 704(a) to 
promulgate regulations that allow taking of migratory birds by loggers 
and others, as long as the regulations are consistent with the terms 
and purposes of the migratory bird conventions.156 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Even though Congress enacted the MBTA over eighty-five years 
ago, its expansive statutory language provides the capacity to address 
current threats to migratory birds.  Nevertheless, courts are extremely 
reluctant to apply the MBTA to habitat destruction and generally hold 
that the statute only applies to hunters and poachers or intentional 
acts.  An analysis of the MBTA’s text, legislative history, purpose, and 
prior applications shows that the statute should be interpreted 
broadly to prohibit some habitat destruction.  A causal link analysis 
may offer a reasoned stopping point for liability, but it does not 
provide needed certainty. 
As threats to wildlife change, the need for environmental statutes 
designed to address these threats increases.  Unfortunately, current 
environmental laws form a fragmented network that leaves wildlife 
inadequately protected.  Extending the MBTA to reach migratory bird 
habitat would fill one of these gaps.  Without a clear mandate from 
 
 154. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, supra note 149, at 12 (citing Draft Memoran-
dum from Director, FWS, to Service Law Enforcement Officers, MBTA Enforcement 
Policy (Mar. 7, 1996)).  The United States Fish and Wildlife Service has refused to 
enforce the MBTA against loggers even in publicized and egregious cases.  Id.  For 
example, the agency refused to prosecute a private landowner that logged trees used 
for nesting by Great Blue Herons, even though the harvest destroyed the entire active 
rookery.  Id.  Even if the United States Fish and Wildlife Service refuses to exercise its 
prosecutorial discretion, environmental groups can use the Administrative Proce-
dures Act to challenge actions of federal agencies that violate the MBTA.  See supra 
note 86.  However, environmental groups are powerless to enforce the MBTA on 
private lands, which supply 94% of the U.S. timber supply.  Alliance for the Wild 
Rockies, supra note 149, at 5. 
 155. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (“As stated 
in one of the early decisions under the Act, ‘an innocent technical violation on the 
part of any defendant can be taken care of by the imposition of a small or nominal 
fine.’”). 
 156. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
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Congress, however, the judiciary is unlikely to demand significant 
changes in management of public lands.  As such, Congress should 
amend the MBTA to explicitly address the current threat that habitat 
destruction poses to biodiversity. 
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